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INDIA AND CHINA: CONTRASTS IN DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE
By Wilfred Malenbaum*
A decade has passed since the problems of economic growth in
the poorer nations became a major foreign policy concern of the wealthy
and powerful nations of the world. In the underdeveloped lands, the
ten years reveal extensive planning activity as well as unprecedented
inflows of technical and capital assistance on government account.
During this period also, the imagination and efforts of many economists
and other social scientists all over the world have turned to the
task of uncovering the secret to the critical transition--the process
by which stagnation may become growth, or progress at a slow rate
may be accelerated. Yet very few countries have succeeded in making
this transition during the decade. In Asia, where live a large part
of the world's population and an even larger part of its poor people,
India and Mainland China alone offer some prospect of such achieve-
ment in the near future.
The relative progress in the development of these two countries
is of great significance. There were strong parallels in their
preplan structure and strong contrasts between China's totalitarian
and India's democratic programs (18, pp.1-24). Their performance
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2relative to one another may influence the programs adopted by other,
now less advanced, countries. It will certainly bear upon Soviet
and United States foreign policies. Furthermore, the record of the
course of development in these two lands provides a unique opportunity
for examining the process of development as such. What are the essential
economic ingredients? Can they be used with equal effectiveness
in democratic and communist societies?
I. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE
India is now in the last half -of .its Second Five Year Plan.
China initiated its Second Plan on January 1, 1958. Records can
actually be compared over the nine-year period ending in 1959. Of
.course, records are available "more or less." India has continued
to publish extensively on its economy and its problems. Since mid-
1955 there na£ been a great expansion in the information available
for Mainland China, in official communist publications, and in an
expanding flow of press and visiting mission reports.
In some major ,respects, comparison of the development record
is hampered more by lack of data from "open" India than from "'closed"
China. Inevitably, it is more difficult to estimate national
savings or investment when a private sector plays an important
role in these basic economic activities than when they are more
nearly the prerogative of government. Furthermore officialdom in
3India has not yet adapted its statistical services to the requirements
of a national development program. Thus even the official record
of the First Five Year Plan does not present investment data for each
of the years 1951-1956. There is no explanation as to how the rough
figures for total investment over the five years were obtained nor
any indication of their sectoral allocation. It is not clear just
how such basic magnitudes as total investment in sectors of the
economy play their role in planning or in postauditing the plans. In
contrast the Chinese, less encumbered, it is true, with the traditional
statistics of normal times, focus pointedly on "accumulation," or
on "capital constructions." They leave no doubt that these are key
magnitudes for their own needs, in planning and in actual development
operations. In these circumstances, nonofficial and even personal
estimates play a significant role in the Indian data as well as in
the Chinese, On the other hand, it is possible to discuss such estimates
with Indian officials, to study basic underlying data, and to observe.
For China, much of the data, even official data, must remain simply
numbers to most students. The data can be "tested" only through
checks of internal consistency or logical relationship to some past
figures.
A. Gross National Product and Gross Investment
The aggregate figures used in the present analysis are given
in Table 1.
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GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND GROSS INVESTMENT
(At Constant Market Prices)
A. India
Gross National Product Gross Investment
Billions
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5Table 1 (Continued)
a. For India, accounting year begins April 1; for China, January 1.
b. Estimates constructed from preliminary official component
data.
c. Orders of magnitude based upon general reports from the two
countries.
Sources:
India. All data for India are my personal estimates, based,
however, upon official materials available through 1956-1957 and to
a lesser extent for 1957-1958 and 1958-1959. The Government of India
(GOI) does prepare estimates of national income at both factor
cost and market price level. These are published in an annual
"white paper" in March (6). Government has not yet released official
annual estimates of capital formation. Where the GOI does make use
of investment figures these are given on a net basis (generally for
groups of years together), for monetized investment only, and
exclusive of changes in stocks (13, pp. 9-10, and 14, pp. 8-11).
Finally, GOI estimates in constant prices are based on the year 1948-
1949.
Where a large proportion of national product is generated without
benefit of financial transactions, as is true for much of agriculture
and rural activity in India (and China), nonmonetized investment is
of great importance. Indeed, in the very nature of the rural economies,
it becomes difficult if not impossible to categorize any meaningful
component. Similarly, the accounting devices available when most
output is produced by entrepreneurs who are generally illiterate raise
doubts about the depreciation adjustment for the private sector, especially
in small enterprise. Moreover, "replacement" for depreciated capital
takes on a net aspect where the new equipment is modern and the existing
machinery long outdated--the frequent situation in these economies.
Official data provide estimates for depreciation on government
account only. However, the GOI has released "unofficial" estimates
on a gross basis and inclusive of transactions made on a barter basis
(8, pp, 154-159). These data, and subsequent materials from the same
source, were used in deriving the estimates for Table 1.
Preliminary unofficial estimates for changes in working stocks
suggest that these expanded by only 1.4 billion rupees over the First
Plan. The year-to-year pattern of changes indicates wide annual
variations rather than any persistent movement. In view of the partial
nature of these data, they could not be incorporated into Table 1.
Finally, all data available only in current prices, or in constant
1948-1949 prices, were shifted to a 1952-1953 price basis by the
6Table 1. (Continued)
use of official series, with separate price indexes applied for the
consumption and investment components of the gross product. (Thus
the data of Table 1 do not reflect the post-1952 tendency for the
unit costs of investment to increase relative to other costs.)
All these adjustments serve to raise the general level of both
the national product and investment series for India in the table
above those usually presented; year-to-year fluctuations are less
affected, especially for the national product series.
China. Data, 1950-1957 are from W. W. Hollister (5, pp. 132-133).
These were constructed from budget and retail sales data and augmented
by direct estimates for farm consumption, private investment, various
consumer services, and inventory changes (5, pp. xxii-xxiv). Except
for the inclusion of changes in working stocks, the data are analytically
identical with those presented for India. I have added the 1958
figures. They reflect about as large an increase in real product
as any actually achieved in the period since 1950. The investment
ratio for 1958 (22 per cent) has some basis in official source materials.
(Actual developments of 1958 assure that gross real product will be
appreciably above that in the table.)
The gross national product figures of Table 1 are generally
higher than those derived directly from official Chinese sources;
also they increase at a somewhat slower rate than do the more official
estimates. On the other hand, Table 1 estimates for gross investment tend
to be below official estimates. (The most convenient source for the
official data are in the translations prepared by the Amorican Consulate
in Hong Kong. A recent survey (25, passim) gives basic data for national
income and its separation into consumption and investment. These
are reported in current prices.)
Official estimates of output are formulated with a Marxist
concept of value: they exclude certain transport and service earnings
which are included in Western (and Indian) national income figures--
and in the Hollister data. The differences in the rate of increase.
in the two series can be attributed at least in part to important
underestimates in official output figures in agriculture, 1950-1953,
thus exaggerating the upward trend in total output over the plan
years (5, pp. 17-23).
With respect to investment, the present estimates have been
built up by major sectors on the basis of all the Chinese material
available. For 1953-1957 these components and their total are consistent
with the complete account of investment expenditures presented by
the Chinese in their 1956 publication on the First Five Year Plan
(1, pp. 27-37). This governmental source gives 89.2 billion yuan
7as the five-year total, on both public and private account, for various
kinds of investment and for depreciation as well as for expenditures
for the "maintenance of schools" and for operating expenses of urban
public utilities"--items appropriately considered current rather than
capital outlays. Nonetheless, this comprehensive total is below the
five-year total (92 billion yuan) of the official investment figures--
and these are presented as net investment in fixed and working
capital. The official investment series appears to be the result
of applying a net investment ratio to estimates of national income.
No sectoral dataare given, and the total net investment is consistently
larger than other investment data--for "economic expenditures" and
for "capital construction expenditures"--used by the Chinese for
budgetary purposes. Components of these latter are given in deta1
and over time; they include working capital, researca and developmei;
expenditures, and outlays for repair and replacement as well as for
new capi-tal. Because of the lack of component data in the official
series and because its totals of net investment are consistently aboVe
careful estimates--including some by the Chinese themselves--for gross
investment, the investment series of Table 1 are considered to be more
meaningful than those officially presented.
It should also be noted that, in converting estimates in current
prices to a 1952 basis, separate price indexes .are applied to gross
investment. This retains the 1952 price relationship of captial to
other goods. (There is some tendency in China for the prices oi other
goods to increase relative to capital goods in the years after 1952
This is the opposite of that noted above for India. It was therefore
important to eliminate the effect of this divergent movement from
the original data.)
81. Relative rates of change. India achieved an annual rate of
growth of real income of almost 3.5 per cent in the period from
April 1, 1950 through March 31, 1959. Over essentially the same
period, the Chinese growth rate was at least three times as great.
China recorded impressive gains in the preplan years when expanding
meant primarily reactivating and rebuilding; large increases in
output were the results of greater use of existing plantsrather
than of new investment. It was not until 1952-1953 that China
regained past levels of aggregate real product. In India, on the
other hand, the expansion has meant new levels of output more o
less from 1950. In addition to comparisons over the entire period,
therefore, it is appropriate to contrast rates of growth for the
respective First Plan periods, from 1951 in India and 1953 in China.
Table 1 shows a 19 per cent growth in India's gross product during
1951-1956, the First Plan period, in contrast to China's 51 per cent
for 1953-1957. There has been a higher annual rate of population
growth in China than in India--perhaps 2 to 2.2 per cent as against
India's 1.4 to 1.7 per cent in these years; increases in per capita
gross income show a somewhat narrower margin for China over India
than do increases in total income.
Gross investment ratios were close to the same level in 1950;
thereafter they increased about three times as fast in China. Moreover,
given the greater expansion in Chinese product, these ratios mean
9that in 1957 and 1958 the real level of gross investment in China
was about five times what it was in 1950; in India, it was not quite
twice the 1950 level. Can these differences be in any way attributed
to differences in foreign capital inflows over these years? Apparently
3.1 per cent of China's gross investment in the years through 19571
(and some 2.1 per cent during the First Plan) was of fset by n not
import surplus. The comparable figures are 8.2 per cent (and 2,3
per cent) for India. If anything, therefore, China financed more
of its investment program on the basis of domestic savings from current
income. However, this is quite consistant with the fact that China
obtained relatively more assistance from other countries. The not
import surpluses in China were financed essentially by loans from
other communist countries and especially the Soviet Union. In India,
on the other hand, a reduction in foreign exchange reserves made
possible some 60 per cent of the import surplus, with only the residual
amount dependent upon foreign grants and loans.
It is interesting to note that China seems to have achieved some
balance in its foreign accounts. For 1957, for example, the inter-
national account shows a small export surplus such as would be consistent
l. Data for 1958 were not included in this comparison, which As thus
confined to the 8 years ending in 1957. As indicated in the next
paragraph of the text, the preliminary evidence is that the contrast
will be strengthened further when firm 1958 figures are available.
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with the need to repay past borrowings (5, pp. 127-129, 132-133)2 .
India's foreign trade deficit was larger in 1956-1957 and again in
1957-1958 than in any other year considered here. The need for
an import surplus may long continue. The differing experiences on
foreign account mean that gross domestic savings ratios have expanded
at an even more rapid rate in China, relative to India, than is the
case for the gross investment series of Table 1. This is also borne
out by comparing the increase in domestic savings as domestic product
expands. Over the entire period 1950-1958, China allocated at least
40 per cent of the expansion in gross output to investment; for the
First Plan period, 1953-1957, it was 44 per cent. Over the same two
time intervals in India, the marginal propensity to save was almost
20 per cent, although for the First Plan itself it was 38,5 per cent.. 4
2. Eollister (5, pp. 132-133). On June 29, 1957, the Chinese
Minister of Finance stated ". . . we may say that we are now in t
better position to rely on our own accumulation to carry on natioral
construction . . . ." (Quoted by P. C. Mahalanobis, 15.) Mahalanobis,
director of the Indian Statistical Institute and the person responsible
for the statistical basis for Indian planning, attributed the favorable
performance in China to a concentration upon the production of "basic
industries (heavy machinery, heavy electricals, machine tools, steel,
fertilizers, trucks, etc.)" to which Russian aid was in considerable
measure directed. India's foreign exchange difficulties arise, he
argues, from the failure to pursue a similar source. But a sufficient
interpretation must run in terms of the growth of output and savings.
Thus, assuming that Russia and Czechoslovakia, for example, were prepared
to continue to export capital goods, China's ability to invest might
have been at least as great if the export surplus of grains had been
expanded at the expense of a growth in basic industries. Which is
better as a matter of the relative costs ,ncurred in acquiring the
s3amne amount of capital goods by the two methods.
3. No inconsistency need exist between this high figure for 1951-1956
and the ratios for 1951-1958 and 1953-1958. The savings series fluctuates:
its peak is in 1955-1956. These computations are crude approximations
to the marginal propensities at best, since they have been computed
directly from the figures in constant prices.
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Even in democratic India, the propensity to consume was significantly
smaller than is usually assumed to be the case in poor agricultural
countries.
2. Absolute comparisons. China's higher rates of domestic
savings obviously mean that India can allocate to consumption a higher
ratio of its domestic product. Furthermore, current expenditures
by government--part of consumption--run at appreciably greater relative
levels in China than in India: the respective ratios in 1957 were
10 per cent and 7 per cent. During many of the years 1950-1958, not
more than 75 per cent of national product thus became available for
household consumption in China; in India the percentage has yet to
fall as low as 80 per cent and is usually about 85 per cent. What
are the absolute levels of income to which these very different
consumption ratios are applied? Can China drain larger shares of
national product away from consumption because the Chinese have
higher levels of living than do Indians?
Some absolute comparison of output in the two countries is
4
possible. India and China have had similar enough economies so that
analytical problems in making the comparisons are relatively small.
On the other hand, some of the data needed are not adequately reported,
especially the prices. The data available permit the following
4. See Gilbert and Kravis (3) for the techniques to be employed.
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conclusions:5
a. Per capita agricultural product was about 15 per cent higher
in China than in India in 1952. This is consistent with a higher
differential in favor of China for food grains alone, since other
foods play a larger role in India and since China usually exports
and India imports grains.
b. For the rest of the economy, per capita output was higher
in India in that year. This conclusion involves some judgment, since
data did not permit a complete comparison for all or nearly all
other goods and services. For commercial fuel and power the per
capita advantage seemed to be with China; in heavy industry, India
was ahead by at least a 20 per cent margin; comparisons for other
items ranged between these limits. Quantitatively, nonagricultural
product per person might have been some 10 per cent higher in India.
c. Per capita incomes in the two countries in 1952 were essfentially
of the same order of magnitude--about Rs. 260 or 130 yuani. This is
concluded simply from the preceding two statements, Agricultural
income provided more than half the total product in China in 1952;
it constituted somewhat less than half in India. Despite verv large
differences in favor of India in the national income estimates
5. 1 am indebted to George Perry and Delmar Underwood, both graduate
students at M.I.T., for the computations upon which these were in
part based.
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generally made, it seems more than likely that the actual incomes
are or were about the same in 195206
At this relatively early stage of the development effort in
both countries, China was investing some 50 per cent more than was
India out of essentially the same real product.7 After allowing
for the different levels of government consumption, it appears that
the average level of household consumption in China was actually
10 per cent to 15 per cent below that in India. As Table 1 u
this situation changed rapidly. Sometime in 1955 or 1956--despite
China's larger allocations to investment and to other governmental
uses, and despite its more rapid rate of population growth--
the per capita levels of household consumption began to forge ahead
of the levels prevailing in India.
B. Levels of Physical Output
1. Agriculture. Table 2 presents series for the all-important
food grains, as we]las for sugar cane and the major fibres, cotton
and jute. Up to the current year--for which results are still uncertai.n--
the data indicate a larger expansion in food grains in China than in
India. However, India's performance during its First Plan was more
impressive than was China's in 1953-1957--a 30 per cent increase
compared with a 22 per cent increase. On a per capita basis,
6. Thus per capita income in China during the forties has been
estimated at about $30, roughly half the official figures for India
converted at the going rates of exchange.
7. In 1952, net import surplus financed 9 per cent of China's gross
investment India had a net export surplus equal to about 5 per cent
of its gross investment.
16
domestically produced food grains in India increased very rapidly
from 335 pounds in 1950-1951 to 444 pounds in 1953-1954. The level
in this year of very favorable weather was not again attained in the
four following years. Indeed, output per capita in 1957-1958 fell
below 400 pounds. In China, there was an early increase from
500 pounds to 600 pounds; favorable harvests in 1954-1955 then boosted
the per capita figure to 645 pounds. The two years through 1957-1958
have seen somewhat higher levels, close to 660 pounds pr ca'pita.
Given the importance of weather in the year-to-year pattern of output
in both countries, however, it is perhaps more significant that only
the Chinese data provide some evidence of a persistent upward trend.
While this might suggest a greater measure of success in overcoming
the natural and human deterrents to expanding production, the record
is searcely definitive.
Indian agricultural statistics are consistent with the claim
that the potential for food grains output has expanded in the
course of the First Plan years to a new level, some 20-25 per cent
above preplan production. At least half of this might be attributed
to additional acreage, mostly the result of expansion in the area
irrigated. The remainder could be due to the effects uppon yields
per acre of a numtber of developments, including more fertilization,
better seed, and improved farm practices generally. However, those
underlying factors would be expected to exert their infinence gradually,
AGR IC VLiRA L OUT7PUT A1 I E
Food Grains Cotton uSugar Can
(M11ilo n T on rs) T h ous F and Tns 0 (Tho11Cusan T ois S llOn T ons
Yeara India Chinit-dia China 0d hn
1950 53 .5 12272 509 681 5 86 77 56,2 3-1
1951 55.06 132 .92 548 1,014 3 835 245 60 7 4 ,6
1952 62A 119 559 1,23 300 7 5 9 7
1953 74,.08 154,A2 690 1,156 c2 552 135-7 44 2 71
1954 69 76 157.9 740 1, w?_ 1 523 134-5 56.9 8c
1955 69,93 174,81 700 1,4944 749 25297 9 3 8
1956 73 2 182.5 830 1,445 768 258 67 8.7
1957b 67,1 185.00 835 1,640 730 305 64 10-2
198C 72,5 225 , 00 825 2,500 750 325 65 13
a Crop year beginning in-
b Official estimates for 1957-1958 subject to final revision,,
c Proliminary.
1, Excludes pulses but includes potatoes; rice in terms of paddy. (Data for India usually given in terms of clean
rice; rice : paddy 2 3,A
2. Includes hemp for Chinac
3. Excludes sugar beets which are important in China
SOURCES
India: 1950-1954, (10, pp ,2-102), 1955-1958, (9, despurrent)c 8
China:. 1950-1955, (10.), pp- 9D2-102)c 19,56-1U958, (24, des-patch No.e 884, April2* 30, 19;i58) ,
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while the output data suggest a shift to a new level during 1952 and 1953,
without systematic expansion thereafter. Even the rather favorable estimate
for the 1958-1959 crop can be attributed in part to climatic conditions; in
any event, grain output of 72.5 million tons does not necessarily mean
that an upward trend in output has been resumed.8
Although food grains output in China in 1957 is officially reported to
exceed the Five Year Plan targets by 1.9 per cent, Chinese sources have made
clear that performance in this sector has been disappointing. Anc some
observers abroad argue that the official record actually exaggerated the
true achievement. 9 But even so, limited progress is indicated through 1957.
Of the 20 per cent expansion during the plan, about 75 per cent represented
increases in yields per acre. To some extent this was also true in the
pre-plan rehabilitation period, although acreage expansion was then relatively
more important. Systematic change--the persistent growth in output, however
small, and the consistency of the contributory factors--probably constitutes
8. A principal conclusion of the first round of India's National Sample
Survey was that "...official statistics Oof food grains production in 1948-
1949 and 1949-1950) seem to be underestimates by something between roughly
20 and 25 per cent... ." (7, pp. 26-28). While the official statistics do
reflect a subsequent expansion of this order of magnitude, the NSS view is
not universally accepted in India. See, for example, Dandekar (2, pp. 153-165)V
9. The American Consul at Hong Kong indicated that 1957 output levels were
"not unreasonable but the means of derivation warn against treating them as
solid" (24, Despatch No. 884). Foreign experts claim that the data for 1950-
1953 are too low and thus overstate the degree of improvement (5, pp. 17-23).
One careful study argues that the official figures, whatever the actual expansion
they reveal since 1949, are still below the output levels of the early thirtis.,
The 1957 target would only achieve that earlier production level--due to an
underestimate (by about one-third) of the actual prewar output (22, passim,,).
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the most significant aspect of Chinese development in this
area.
Other agricultural production in China also reflects the major
rehabilitation efforts of the years through 1952-1953. Thereafter
it is only in cotton, a key product for Chinese industry, where there
is evidence of a major drive for expanded output. In India, products
other than grain reveal about the same proportionate output increase
over the entire period through 1957-1958 as do the food grains. On
the whole, the record in agriculture suggests a more impressive per-
formance for China in the food grains; for India in other food products
and industrial raw materials.
These offsetting tendencies are reflected in the indexes of
agricultural output available for the two countries. From 1950
through 1957, aggregate output in agriculture rose by some 25 to
30 per cent in China and 15 to 20 per cent in India. This is a much
smaller difference than exists for the food grains alone. Agricultural
production has increased at a lower rate in China than has aggregate
production; income from agriculture has become of lesser importance
in the total product. For India, agriculture and the rest of the
economy seem to have kept more nearly in line0 1 0
The agricultural effort in China has been closely directed by
government. While there was much talk of broadening and improving
diets, the focus has been on the food grains in order to derive
10. See page 31.
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macimum energy output per unit of expenditure for agticultural expansion.,
Even in adverse weather years, the Chinese did succeed in expanding
grain output by about as much as population. The picture in India
has been quite different. The degree of government direction was
relatively small. Profitability considerations governed with respect
to commercial productione The bulk of the output, especially grains,
is produced for local or even for producer use, and the underlying
motivations here are less readily characterized. Certainly, the programs
of government--for expanding the acreage under irrigation, for improving
methods of cultivation including the greater application of commercial
fertilizers--had a smaller influence than the development plans promised.
Weather remained the predominant factor and accounts for the largest
increases in production observed over past years.
The scope for improvement in agriculture remains large, and
particularly in India (19, pp. 7-8, 11-12). Thus rice, the preferred
food grain, accounts for about half the grain output in both countries0
Yet, the yield per acre in China in 1957 was about half that in Japan;
it is generally about twice that in India. Officialdom in both
countries has recognized the need to devote much greater effort to
this sector. Thus, over the past two years, Indian leadership has
increasingly questioned whether a basis for systematic expansion
of food grain output has in fact been established in India0 Today,
this is the major problem on the Indian development scene, and new
19
programs for agricultural progress are receiving ever greater priority 1 1
In China, new efforts initiated in 1957 began to manifest themselves
early in 1958. Already the rapid extension of small scale irrigation,
the increased rates of fertilization, and much more intensive cul-
tivation bid fair to assure record levels of crop yields for 1958-
1959, and this despite relatively unfavorable weather in many parts
of important agricultural regions 1 2
2. Industry. For major industrial products (Table 3) the
comparative records are more straightforward. Aggregate industrial
output in the modern sector has made much greater progress in China.
Both indexes give some evidence of a slackening of the rates of growth
of big industry during 1957, although current reports from China
suggest that the revised figure for 1958 will testify to a resumption
of a pronounced upward trendo In interpreting the series, it should
be noted that 1950 was still a year when expansion was primarily
the result of reactivation and rehabilitation of existing plant, and
this was true to a greater extent in China than in India. Also,
11. India's National Development Council, in January 1958 and again
in May, made pointed reference to the unevenness of past results and
to the gap between expenditures and performance. Striking were the
observations on the failure to make use of the irrigation facilities
already constructed. For the outlines of the crash program adopted
for the current crop, see (11, pp. 39-49, and 12, pp. 13-15).
12. Reports stress the "big leap forward" in crop yields. Thus
the Chinese claim that the major early rice crops already promise
a 50 per cent increase over the 1957 yields per acre. Total food
grain output is officially projected at 300 million tons, almost 65
per cent above last year's crop (24, Despatch No. 995, June 13, 1958;
and No. 364, November 3, 1958). While this may reflect early optimism,
a record increase can be expected. As was indicated earlier (p. 10),
there is evidence that First Plan levels of grain output are well
below prewar figures of 200 to 220 million tons (22, pp,. 11-20).
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The Chinese indexes suffer from considerable double counting, given
Marxist procedures for adjusting for intermediate goods in production.
Fortunately, available data permit. straightforward comparison for
physical output of more or less identical products,
For every commodity in Table 3 Chinese rates of increase
have exceeded India's by sizable amounts, In some cases--steel,
cement, electrical power, textil --Chinese output and capacity were
smaller in 1950 than India's_ In fertilizer and coal, larger
absolute production in China *as about the same or even smaller
on a per capita basis., In every case, however, production levels
for these major commodities are now above those of India. Through
1957 India did retain some advantage in cement and fertilizer on
a per capita basis, but it is probable that such margins are now
disappearing.
On the basis of the less comparable information available for
consumer goods, Chinese perfomance is not nearly so spectacular., As
in the case of textiles, there is evidence of a deliberate limita-
tion of industrial production for consumers whenever such output
would curtail the supplies of power, transport, management and
other scarce inputs for the hard producer goods industries. On
the whole, output of consumer goods by modern industry seems to
have expanded more in India during 1950-1957, and from an originally
higher level.
Details as to China's handicraft and cottage industries under
the communists are not at hand, but there appears to be little parallei
Table 3
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT: MAJOR COMMODITIES
Yeara Aggregate Steel
Production (Million Tons)
19522100
Cement
(Million Tons)
Electric Power
(Million Kwh)
Coal
(Million Tons)
Fertilizer T
(Ammonium (
Sulphate)
(Thousand tons)
extiles
Million Yards)
India China India China India China jIndia China India China India China India China
1950 85 37 1.01 .40 2.68 1.41 5,112 4,580 32,5 40.9 47c3 75 3,650 2,940
1951 96,5 76 1.08 779 3.19 2,48 5,856 5,790 34,3 50.8 52.7 129 4,065 3,570
1952 100 100 1.10 1.19 3,54 2.86 6,192 7,261 36.1 63.5 220.3 181 4,600 4,700
1953 102 129 1,02 1.56 3_78 3 488 6,708 9,165 35.8 666 319.6 226 4,875 5,900
1954 109 152 1e25 1,95 4e41 4.60 7,500 11,001 36.8 79.9 340.2 298 5,000 6,250
.1955 118 166 126 2.51 448 4.50 8,496 12,278 38,3 93.6 393.1 324 5,090 5,330
1956 128 226 1 .34 3,88 4.93 6.42 9,636 16,588 39.4 1059 389 446 5,310 6,500
1957 133 244 1.34 4.26 5o60 6.69 10,725 19,025 43.5 130 379.7 535 5,320 5,825
1 9 5 8b 137 288 1.28 5 6,29 8 18 12,100 23,000 44.8 165 391.3 700 4,940 6,250
a Calendar years0
b, Preliminary: For India, based on monthly reports through September 1958 (21); for China, based on latest
available U.8. government reports (24).
SOURCES :'
India- Official Series (21).
China: Based on figures in (24)3
Prior to 1952, estimated from employment and other data.
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to the direct emphasis given this sector, so important in consumer
goods output, by the government of India. On the other hand, the
Chinese have given much attention to the expansion of modern small
scale industry. This sector constitutes an important adjunct of big
industry in a labor rich country, and China has deliberately furthered
an increase in output from a wide variety of small industries--including
the production and processing of chemicals and pig iron. Achievement
here is far beyond what has yet been accomplished, or ie even projected,
by India.
3. Education. In regard to education and professional training,
India seems to have started its development program with a considerable
advantage. There were some 22 million children in school in 1950,
almost one-third of those in the 6-14 age group. Today there may
be 37 million. 45 per cent of those in this age group (14, pp. 501-504,
and 11, pp. 91-93). China had a lower percentage in 1950 (22.5 per cent)
but is reported to have almost 60 per cent of children aged 6-14 in
school today (1, pp. 201-203, and 24). At the other end of the
educational process, China in 1955 was training annually 30.9 engineers
and 11.2 medical doctors per million persons in its population.
Comparable figures for India were 18A and 8'1 respectively, Continu-
ation of these rates would within ten to twenty years reverse the more
advanced position which India had in these professional fields in
1955 (15, p. 5).
23
Additional activities might be mentioned, although the major
areas have been considered. Thus cinema attendance and passenger
travel have increased considerably in India over the past decade or
so--probably much more than in China, and again from an initially
higher level. It is not possible to extend such physical comparison
to encompass the entire national product. Nor will this ever reflect
differences of a qualitative sort--the variety of food and other
consumer goods in India, the opportunity to select goods and services,
On the whole, however, the Chinese margin of 1952 in per capita
agricultural production does seem to have been maintained--and even
widened over the years to 1958. With respect to big industry, India
lost ground relatively--the result of a large expansion in China
which made its modern industry sector a much more important part
of total product than is India's. However, the actual availability
of nonfood consumer goods to the Indian citizen seems to have increased
more than in China. Given the major role of grain in consumption
and of food in the levels of living in the two countries, these
general statements certainly, do not impair the plausibility of our
earlier conclusion on the relative growth of national output in India
and China.
The record of comparative performance thus reveals that China
has taken greater strides in investment, and this on the basis of
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greater reliance upon domestic savings. Gross output per person actually
increased more than twice as fast as India's.. Indeed, Chinese con-
sumption (governmental and personal) per capita in 1957 was about
20 per cent above the 1952 figure; the comparable increase in India
was 8 per cent in 1955-1956 over 195O-1951. The present analysis
thus indicates economic developments overwhelmingly favorable to
the Chinese effort , with respect to both actual performance and
potential for further growth.
I I. REASONS UNDERIXING THE CONTRAST IN PERFORMANCE
What explains the different results? One characteristic of the
data which warrants special attention is the relationship between
investment and total output. Table 1 yields the following ratios
between gross investment and the increase in gross product over the
indicated time intervals;
India China
1950-1957 4 2.2
First Plan 3.1 2,5
Pre-First Plan 6.7 1.4
Post-First Plan 51 1.7
For the period as a whole, China seems to have generated a unit of
gross income flows with little more than half the gross investment
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that was applied in India.l3 Only for the plan periods proper are
the calculations for the two countries in reasonable line--with
India's about one-quarter above the figure for China. The record
thus indicates greater "efficiency" in China in converting a given
13. So striking are these differences that the computations warrant
a few further observations. The underlying statistics of product
and investment were presented as comparable sets of estimates. (See
notes to Table 1 pp. 4a-4d.) In fact, the major departure arose from
our inability to include changes in working stocks in India's gross
investment; on this account the ratios above understate the difference
between India and China.
Official Chinese figures for depreciation in the economy as a
whole do tend to be on the low side. But these estimates do not
play a direct role in the figures of gross investment used here, In
any case, low depreciation levels in the official statistics mean
high estimates of accumulation (net investment) rather than low estimates
of gross investment. Another point is that, in communist countries
generally, prices of capital goods, and indeed unit costs of capital
formation, tend to be low relative to other prices. This might in
itself provide lower capital output ratios than prevail in a free
market economy. However, while it was not possible to make a direct
comparison of the pertinent price relationships in India and China
in 1952, the deflating procedures used here maintained in each
country the price relationships of that year. The different relative
movements over the years should thus not affect the capital output
calculations.
With regard to the ratios themselves, it is true that they fluctuate
markedly from year to year in each country; most of the specific figures
above would thus be different were the time coverage altered somewhat.
Yet, there are no groups of years which would give reverse results,
or indeed very different relative results, for the two countries. Thus,
were rough adjustments made for the special influences which weather
had upon output in some years in each country, the relative ratios
would reveal a wider margin in favor of China than is shown for the
two plan periods, for example. Similarly, inclusion of the preliminary
data for 1958 does not appreciably alter any of the calculations.
Thus differences observed are not attributable to the particular groups
of years selected for the comparisons.
26
amount of gross investment into additional capacity or at least
product.l4
This phenomenon is magnified by the fact that the Chinese have
been able to increase their allocations of current product to investment
at a more rapid rate. Rough calculations suggest that, for the
period as a whole, 55 per cent of the difference in the rate of growth
in the two countries can be attributed to the greater efficiency
with which the Chinese apply investment; 45 per cent is thus attributable
to the more rapid rate of expansion in investment,.
A. Different Allocations of Investment
The different results must be traceable to allocations of investment
and to the specific forms in which investment is actually made. Thus
scale of plant rgay reducecapital costs per unit of product; invest-
ment costs will be low if outlays for labor in construction, for
example, exclude or undervalue contributed or forced labor, and the
like. What evidence is there for differences between the development
effort in India and China in these regards?
Although data will not permit ready comparison of the allocation
patterns in all years, it is possible to separate out for both countries
the investment in two broad groupings: agriculture, including irrigation,
water conservancy, community development, and some simple handicrafts
14. In characterizing the conversion as more "efficient," I mean
only that less capital is used for the same volume of output, presumably
with the same lag.
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close to agriculture such as rice polishing; and industry, which includes modern
industry and powero Table 4 gives these allocations on a percentage basis for
groups of years.
Pre-Plan
Table 4
ALLOCATION OF GROSS INVESTMENT
(Per Cent)
First Plan Cen ond
First 3 years Last 2 years
India China India China India China India
(1950) (1950-52) (1951-53) (1953-55) (1954-55) (1956-57) (1956-57)
Agriculture 28 32.7 26.5 27.6 26.5 27 24,5
Industry 23.4 .36.6 25c6 35.5 24.3 45 29,,2
(including-
power)
Other 48.6 30.7 47.9 36.9 49,2 28 46,3
sectors
SOURCESZ
India- My estimates based on provisional data released by government (9, pp,. 154-
159).
China: Estimates based primarily on (5, 24, and 1).
Over the period, investment has become relatively less important in agriculture
and more important in industry, as would be expected. Both movements have been
more marked in China. More significant, however, are two other comparisons reflected
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by Table 4. Contrary to the impression which prevails generally,15
a large percentage of total investment has been allocated to the
agricultural sectors in China; throughout the period, this percentage
has exceeded India's. In addition, there has been a marked difference
in the emphasis given by China to physical product as against services.
Thus, despite the superIority of Ihdia's road and railway network
in the preplan years, India in the last few years seems to have
allocated almost as large a proportion of total investment to transport
and communication as China allocated to these plus social services,
trade and finance, education, health, and the like,
These striking contrasts notwithstanding, Table 4 itself throws
little light on the problem of "efficiency" of investment. China
puts more into agriculture, which has frequently turned out to be
a sector where relatively large returns follow from a unit of new
capital--at least in underdeveloped areas where yields per acre are
very low initially. On the other hand, the still larger Chinese al-
location to industry, and to a type of industry where the capital/
15. My earlier observations (18, pp. 13-14) were also in this vein.
Actually, agricultural investment was planned at less than 10 per
cent of the public program but mich larger amounts were to be invested
by the peasants themselves "c..in addition the development of agriculture
credit cooperatives will make it possible to draw a huge amount of
idle capital into agricultural production" (1, p. 33). A delegation
of Indian governmental specialists in agriculture also reported this
same preponderance of agricultural investment in China relative to
India (10, pp. 133-135).
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labor ratio is high, might well operate the other-way. Also, India's
emphasis upon tertiary sectors would suggest on the whole a larger
increase in output from the same level of new investment, although
this argument is not firm, since transport itself tends to have a
high capital output ratio, as does also investment in housing, included
here under social services. On this last, one point does warrant
mention. The greater allocations to services might mean more investment
in the overhead sectors which in turn will permit greater returns
from direct investment in the future. India's past pattern, in other
words, may well be the more efficient, given a longer time horizon.
However relevant this possibility, other evidence does not suggest
that the rate of growth prospects for the years ahead can be considered
more favorable to India as a consequence of the current investment
patterns.
B. Some Sectoral Capital Coefficients
A few precise relationships can be traced with the data at hand.
Thus the ratio between gross real investment and the increase in
real income in agriculture in India is 2.33 for the period 1951 through
1956. Essentially the same figure (2.28) is obtained for China for
1951 through 1957.16 A comparison of the investment which corresponded
166 The ratios appear to be more volatile in India. Thus a much less
favorable relationship is obtained if the computation for India
includes the disappointing crop year 1957-1958.
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to an increase of (productive capacity for?) one million long tons
of food grains over the period also reveals a similar parallelism
in the experience of the two countries. Again, there is some basis
for imputing an advantage to the Chinese on the ground of relatively
more consistent results over the period,17
While tLe evidence in the agricultural sectors can be interpreted
as suggesting reasonably comparable capital output relationships,
for industry it indicates a clear advantage for China,, The gross
capital output ratio for Indian industry and power was at least 6:1.
For China, value-added computations for industry are less readily
presented, given the problem of double counting, The ratio of gross
investment in industry to the total value of industrial production
lies in the .9-1,1 range for different groups of years during 1950-
1957. On the assumption that total value is of the order of three
times the value added, 1this suggests that the comnarable canital
output ratio for China would be about 3 1--or half the level of India's,
17. Essentially equal results in these calculations involve an
assumption that the official yuan rupee rate of 1:2 undervalues the
yuan to some extent. Other evidence on relative prices does not
support this inference, See, for example, (10, pc 41, 20, pp,, 60-61,
and above, pp. 7-9). For whatever relevance it hasthe recent Hong Kong
free market rate of 1:1.2 suggests the opposite.
18. Based on computations made by W. W. Hollister (as reported in
a personal commnication).
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The national income series in the two countries show quite
different patterns with respect to the relative importance of income
from agriculture, In India this ratio was 50 per cent before the Plan,
47 per cent during it, but seems again to be close to 50 per cent
in recent Second Plan years . The accounts for China show a fairly steady
decline from 70 per cent 19in 1950 to 50 per cent in 1957. Thus the
major sector where capital-output ratios seem to be more or Less the
in the two countries became of appreciably less importance in Chine.
A ,,ector where the ratios are notably different--modern industry--
Las grown relatively in China, Finally, the different rates at which
the tertiary sectors expand would also favor larger product, at least
in the short run, in China, Together, these different sectoral results
may explain the differences in over-all capital output ratios--although
nothing in the above explains these sectoral results.
C, The relative Scale of Public Investment
There are importantdifferences between India and China in the
relative scales of public investment , While this direct role of
government in development has been expanding at more rapid rate in
India (Table 5), the Chinese ratio for the economy as a whole in the
19. This figure reflects the uuderutilization of existing nonagricultural
plant in the 1949-1951 period. By 1951 the ratio was close to 60
per cent, and it has been declining rather steadily since then (5, p 9),.
32
past two years was still double that of India. Modern industry and
power are today essentially entirely within China's public sector;
even in agriculture which was relatively free enterprise in 1950,
government participation is now more important than is true in
India.
Does the degree of centralization of investment activity influence
efficiency?
Table 5
THE RATIO OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT TO TOTAL INVESTMENT
(Per Cent)
Second
Pre Plan First Plan Plan
First 3 Years Last 2 Years
India China India China India China India
(1950) (1950-52) (1951-53) (1953-55) (1954-55) (1956-57) (1956-57)
All sectors 27.8 67 28.4 76.3 38.2 81 38,7
Agriculture 28.4 20 6 29.9 31.9 41.4 39.3 35.2
Industry 17.8 89.6 19.8 93.7 28.1 96.7 34
Sources: Same as in Table 4.
Presumably, identical enterprises could be established and managed
with comparable efficiency by government, or by private interests,
or by the two combined in some mix,, But limited delegation of authority
in government enterprise might serve to make public operation less
efficient in a relatively free-market economy. Conversely, the talents
of the private enterpreneur must be less evident in an economic order
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in which his operations are intertwined with operations of government-
controlled economic activities. On such counts alone, the output
from enterprises in a mixed economy may be smaller than from the
same enterprises in a more monolithic economic order, However, the
relative efficiency of the two patterns revealed in Table 5 cannot
be assessed simply by evaluating the performance of public and private
enterprises under different conditions,, More relevant is the fact
that the seemingly same type of enterprise becomes quite different
in the highly centralized Chinese effort and in the much less controlled
program in Iadia.
Withir agriculture, within industry, within each category of
service, there is in each country a different collection of end-
products which comprise output. Of the current flow of goods and ser-
vices in the Indian economy the private sector still creates 90 per
cent. Product must thus satisfy the demands on a relatively free
market, Today, even steel is produced almost entirely in the private
sector. While government allocates most of the steel available in
India, a significant percentage of the total supply (50 per cent or
so) does not go to government. In China, essentially all finds its
way into defense, railways, and the broad public development programe
Output per unit of investment mist be lower for a steel industry which
processes to meet the needs of many different users. This is even
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more true for consumer goods. Thus the modern textile industry in
India produces a greater number of counts per million yards than
does any other country's, and particularly China's. Increasingly,
construction specifications for all buildings in China have been
tailored to meet standards for costs per square foot established by
region. India has moved much less far here.
As there are differences in product from the same type of enter-
prise, so also with respect to production techniques. Thus it is
relevant that China does use, in construction activity particularly,
a large volume of unpaid or underpaid labor, Frequent attention has
been called to the possibilities in this direction in lands like
India and China where the social order generally provides for con-
sumption even though workers are persistently underemployed. India
seel:s to mobilize this productive capacity through various voluntary
programs, notably in the community development projects. Chinese
efforts of this sort seem to have gone much farther and on a less
voluntary basis (4, pp. 27-28) 20
The predominance of public investment in China may thus contribute
to lower investment costs per unit of product because government
restricts the degree of choice in either factor or product
20. In India (13, p. 116) the galue of all popular contributions to
the community development program was of the order of 3.5 rupees
per person in the project area. This would mean at the outside less
than 5 days of contributed labor per person over as long as four and
one half years in some villages.
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mar;ets, The private sector is indeed a decisive force in Indiafs
economy, In the plans, government has consistently over-estimated
the extent to which private enterprise will govern itsinvestment and
production activities "according to plan."' Thus, since 1950, govern-
ment has actually invested less and the rest of the economy more
than was planned. A vigorous private sector has retained a greate'
volume of its savings for direct investment; there was a reduced
transfer of private savings to the public sector. New investment in
private industry has been of a more capital-intensive type than was
apppropriate to India"s factor endowment (16). In contrast, China's
centralized control of investment has meant investment more nearly
as planned and with centralized decisions as to the techniques for
production. When unplanned developments occurred--unfavorable
harvests, lower grain deliveries--the control of savings in the economy
gave government considerable Tlexibility in adapting annual programs
to actual events.
D. Contrasting Policies with Regard to Saving
Nearly half the difference in output performance arose from
China's higher investment ratios, Government has assumed responsi-
bility for a very large part of the savings function through an
21 Many people would argue that freedom of choice and variety itself
are attributes which enhance product values. The question here
is only the point at which they impinge upon (physical)output in very
poor countries.
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expansion in the scale and forms of taxation, especially upon agri-
culture, and through the growing importance of state enterprises in
many fields. Thus tax receipts more than doubled between 1950 and
1952; thereafter they increased by about 50 per cent, aggregating
almost 15 per cent of gross national income in each year, Limita-
tions upon private consumption and investment meant also that rivste
savings (especialy nonagricultural) moved readily to the public
sector through the banks, other savings schemes, and the band market
Indeed, government--central, provincial, and local--in China has spent
at least 25 per cent of the total national income in each year since
1952. About 11 or 12 per cent went for the usual administrative
activities of government, including military services, and 13 to 18
per cent for capital maintenance and expansion (5, pc6). An increasing
percentage of this last was accounted for by the profits and capital
consumption allowances of state enterprises. The total of domestic
gross savings mounted steadily (with one set-back in 1955) and have
averaged 22 per cent of GNP in the past few years. Government develop-
ment plans envisage a slight reduction--or at most the maintenance--
of this ratio in the future.
Savings in India are still essentially private. Government
surpluses on current account were not expected to be significant over
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the Second Plan period, The public investment program essentially
22 The plan shows a surplus of about Rs. 10,5 billion, but this is
more or less matched by current rather than investment outlays in the
developpent program (16).
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has depended upon borrowing domestically and abroad. Actual per-
formance from 1956 to date has apparently intensified this situation.
Revenue from taxation has varied between 7.5 and 9 per cent of gross
national income since 1950, While direct taxes on agriculture (land
and income) ha'e been increasing, they still account for less than
10 per cent of the total tax revenues ia 1956-1957, Rough estimates
of the total tax burden for agriculture suggest an order of magnitude
of about 20 per cent of all taxes, as compared with a ratio at least
three times as great in China. Profits and capital consumption allowance
from state enterprises in India are still essentially confined to
the traditional public enterprises--the railways and postal services,
These contribute a relatively small amount to government finance.
The government of India, currently responsible for less than 40 per
cent of total investment in India, is thus much more heavily dependent
on outside, nongovernmental sources of investment finance than is
the government of CMina, which is responsible for more than 80 per
cent of total investment in that country. The domestic savings ratias
do net seem to have expanded since 1955, and government has had con-
siderable difficulty in attracting them to public investment, As
mentioned earlier, the public development program over the next few
years will certainly be more heavily dependent upon foreign resources
than in the past, and the turning point in this dependence cannot
yet be foreseen (17).
III - IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELSEWHERE
There are no magic formulas for achieving an expanding per capita
income, The tasks confronting nat.ionfls with very low levels of average out-
put are most di.fficult at best. The rapid growth periods in India
during the last few years of the First Plan and in China in some of
the years treat.ed here need to be considered abnormal. They were
related to favorable weather or to t he exploitation of existing excess
capacity.. These apart, continuing progress requires persistent efforts
by the people under capable and irspring leadership ,
Consider a few I1ey problems and the different approaches to
them in India and China. Most poor countries have abundant supplies
of labor relative to capital. Along with t'he need to move toward
more capital-intensive methods of production in certain sectors,
there is a complementary role for labor-intenstve pursuits in rural
areas especially, but in cities also. The gains from expanding the
productivity o! labor now inefficiently used are enhanced by the fact
that there do exist complementary capital resources--in existing equip-
ment, in nonmonetized savings-- which cannot be transferred, Despite
the greater emphasis given by the Chinese to the development of moder'n
industry, they have also devoted major energy to the task of mobilizin~g
these underutilized resources for plan objectives. Through S sequence
of devices, culminating in today s conuminunes, China "S government has
played a fundamental role in organizing local resources--labor, existing
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plant, raw materials, savings (especially nonmonetized), leadership
of both enterprise and public administration--to expanded agricultural
and industrial product.
Mention has already been made of nonmonetized savings. Wherever
a significant part of national product is imputed because it never
goes to market, there will be savings in the form of inventories of
final product which are used directly, perhaps as payments in kind,
in capital creation. In both India and China some 25 to 30 per cent
of all gross investment may have occurred in nonmonetized form in
1950. This ratio has apparently not changed much in India, but it
has declined markedly in China, partly because the Chinese attempt
to siphon out of the rural areas whatever is or can be monetized,
and partly because of the differential expansion of nonagricultural
investment. In contrast to China, India does not even take explicit
account of this important form of rural savings and investment, despite
the fact that Indian experience has pointed up both its size and potential
(23, p. 63).
Unemployment constitutes a political as well as an economic
threat in underdeveloped countries. The employment objective explains
part of India's preoccupation with the handicraft sector; emphasis
here has even been allowed to interfere with cost and efficiency con-
siderations in the production of consumer goods by the modern industry
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sector. Progress is only now beginning to be made toward the expansion
of tie modern small-scale sector which either competes with large
industry or complements it. Great attexition is now given this sector
ii Chinese industrial development, There are benefits to employment
and output gains fron using resources raised locally. The Chinese
have found that emphasis on this small-scale sector of industry has
also facilitated the program of regional development by providing
employment opportunities away from the large industrial centers.
The inability of the large cities to provide as much employment
as people seek has become most apparent, even in China with its strong
stress on irdurtrial development. The Chinese have recognized ex-
plicitly the dangers arising from the unemployment of overurbanization
and have devised various measures (involving involutary transfers
of people, compulsory registration, etc.) for dealing with the problem,
In this context, the emphasis on employment opportunities in the smaller
centers and rural areas takes on greater importance. In India, the
parallel dangers have not yet produced a clear policy. Growing over-
urbanization has tended, rather, to expand social overhead expenditure
in urban areas beyond what the development requirements of these
centers might otherwise have been.
For some parts of the program, particularly for industry, the
government of India has chosen to rely heavily upon the private sector.
The experience here leaves no doubt about the major gains possible
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from energy and drive of private entrepreneurs. But these can be
realized over a prolonged period only when government also fulfills
major investment responsibilities: in the social and economic over-
head sectors, and in certain directly productive fields where private
investment has limited experience and resource requirements are very
high (e.g., steel and producer goods) or where effective economic
change involves a major program of social action (as in peasant
agriculture, rural output generally). Fulfilling this complementary
role in a society of mixed enterprise requires careful study of the
flow patterns of domestic savings and the determination to adopt
policies which can appropriately influence this pattern,
Structural unemployment, underutilized resources, overurbanization,
non-monetized savings and investment flows--these are illustrative
of the types of problems that must be understood and treated if there
are to be steady output gains in most of today's underdeveloped areas,
Indian leadership has not yet assumed the responsibilities for
organization and planning required to meet these problems. This is
highlighted by the fact that the ratio of government to total expenditure
is lower than in any other country for which national product statistics
are available23 China's relative success in its development effort
23. For a complete listing of a related statistic, see (19, pp. 382-
84)- The ratio for India is less than 1/3 that for the United States
or Canada, for example.
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bids fair to be maintained, if not expanded. It is not unrealistic
to expect internal pressures to impede progress. Indeed, apart from
adverse harvests and the like, the years ahead may well see some
reduction in the relative allocations of income to investment and
some increases in levels of living.
Are the contrasts in methods--and achievements--inseparable
from contrasts in political philosophy? It is true that Chinese
resource mobilization and allocation, Chinese methods of dealing
with unemployment and urban growth doweigh seriously upon the individual
citizen and especially on a peasantry long proud of its individualism.
These procedures could not be reconciled with the dictates of the
Indian Constitution or with the political and social philosophy of
present-day leadership in that country. But alternative actions
might well accomplish the same, or nearly the same, objectives0 For
reasons which cannot be attributed to India's adherence to the tenets
of democracy, rural taxation is minimal; tax evasion is high; government
controls a small proportion of the economy. The community development
schemes offer an excellent and democratic mechanism for mobilizing
idle or poorly allocated resources in rural areas. Economic inducements
might deter the rural-urban population push. The scope for such actions
under democracy is broad.
The growing awareness of Chinese achievement relative to India's
can have a profound influence upon world political and economic
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developments. But the lesson to be derived from the comparative
performance of the two countries over these years of intensive develop-
ment planning is not that totalitarian methods serve better than
those conceived and implemented under democracy. It is rather that
government in nations aspiring to economic expansion needs to define
the tasks of growth realistically; more, government must implement
them faithfully.
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